INTRODUCTION
The role of Islam in the politics of Muslim-majority countries has attracted a plethora of scholarly research over the past two decades that generally refers to this phenomenon as political Islam. However, others have expressed pessimism about the extent to which domestic conditions in Muslim-majority countries and external geopolitical factors will allow the development of an Islamic democracy. 6 Abdelwahab El-Affendi, for instance, sees four main options for Islamists: full revolutionary takeover of their respective countries; completely withdrawing from political office to become Islamic interest or pressure groups; building broader coalitions while maintaining their ideology; or radically restructuring in order to emulate the model of Turkey's Justice and What is missing in this discussion is attention to the capacity of Islamic political parties to draw on Islamic tradition and evolve in response to modernity through a focus on Islam's higher objectives or a maqasid approach.
As a religion that has come to be defined by its adherents inseparably from a pre-modern religious law, Islam has been seriously challenged by modernity. Islamic intellectuals such as Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Vali Nasr, Tariq Ramadan and Louay Safi, and increasingly Islamic political leaders including Malaysia's Anwar Ibrahim, Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Tunisia's Rachid Ghanouchi have striven to demonstrate Islam's compatibility with democracy, human rights, gender equality, pluralism and peaceful coexistence with non-Muslims. 8 I argue that a contextual-maqasid methodology of Quranic interpretation enables such values, principles and standards to be recognized as "Islamic." 9 Islamic political parties have struggled for decades to find the appropriate balance between Islam and modernity. This article thus concurs with a growing body of literature that advocates the maqasid as providing the basis of a methodology that provides this balance. I discuss the maqasid not as an Islamic legal philosophy but as an approach to understanding and practicing Islam that defines the identity and informs the policies of many contemporary Islamic-oriented parties. The maqasid approach enables these parties to maintain Islamic legitimacy while evolving from ideology-oriented to policy-oriented parties and thereby responding to the needs and aspirations of broad constituencies.
That Islam will continue to be relevant in society and politics of Muslim-majority countries is evidenced by the election of Islamic parties in the aftermath of uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The election of Islamic-oriented parties outside of this context, most notably in Turkey, as well as the electoral successes of Islamic-oriented parties in Malaysia and Indonesia also confirms this point. Such political victories should not be taken for granted, however. By the late 1990s, the first generation of Islamic political parties, which were generally anti-Western, ideology-oriented, focused on moralistic discourse and defined by their commitment to establishing an Islamic state based on the implementation of shariah as a law code, had lost much of the electoral support they attracted during the 1980s and early 1990s.
10
Those twentieth-century parties that did not evolve were superseded by a second generation of Islamic-oriented political parties that seek positive relations with Western nations, are policy-oriented and do not advocate the concept of an Islamic state based on shariah law.
11
These parties, which include Turkey's AKP, Malaysia's People's Justice Party (PKR) and Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), developed in response to the needs and aspirations of their people for honest and sincere leadership. They seek to reduce corruption and unemployment, promote economic growth and raise living standards, and protect basic rights and freedoms. 12 Other key factors in their rise include the secular and/or pluralistic character of their respective countries along with the imperative to avoid the stigma of association with extremist violence and consequent risk of isolation by the West. In response, second generation Islamic-oriented parties developed comprehensive political programs, appealed to broad and diverse constituencies, and emphasized Islamic values, principles and objectives. In the context of South East Asia, the maqasid approach has been central to this process. 13 The concept of maqasid is not used by Turkey's AKP. However, Islam's higher objectives should be consistent with universal values is an idea prevalent within the party. 14 While it is still too early to tell, the maqasid approach does have the potential to reform shariah-based laws in Muslim-majority countries. Such reform is particularly relevant in the context of human and civil rights. A report published by Freedom House concerning women's rights in the MENA region states that "women throughout the Middle East continue to face systematic discrimination in both laws and social customs. Deeply entrenched societal norms, combined with conservative interpretations of shariah, The report also contends that in nearly all of the countries examined, "progress is stymied by the lack of democratic institutions, an independent judiciary, and freedoms of association and assembly. Excessively restrictive rules on the formation of civil society organizations make it more difficult for women's advocates to effectively organize and lobby the government for expanded rights." 16 Yet, the report documents that important steps have been made to improve the status of women over the last five years, and that women in fourteen out of seventeen countries in the region have recorded some gains in terms of economic opportunities, access to education, political participation, protection from domestic abuse, and equality before the law. 17 It is in this political context that the maqasid has the potential to make its most significant contribution to the reform of Islamic laws by contributing to a path towards democracy as well as the freedoms and institutions necessary for citizens to advocate for their rights.
Based on analysis of statements made by party leaders, political manifestos and programs of Turkey's AKP, Malaysia's PKR, Indonesia's PKS, Morocco's Justice and Development Party (PJD), Tunisia's An-Nahda Party, and Egypt's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) as well as interviews conducted with representatives of the AKP, PKR and PKS, I describe the decline of the first generation of Islamic political parties, the rise of the second generation, and the role of the maqasid approach in this process. I will explicate the value of the maqasid approach for the sustainability of Islamic political parties emerging in the MENA region in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. First, however, it is essential to begin with a discussion of the concept of maqasid and its revival in the twenty-first century.
I. THE MAQASID REVIVAL
Since the turn of the century, there has been a revival of scholarly writing on the maqasid. To understand this phenomenon, the historical context of its development should be explained. The thirteenth century was a period of great turmoil for the Muslim world, particularly for those regions that suffered invasion by the Mongols. In the following
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THE RELEVANCE OF A MAQASID APPROACH 493 century, scholarship sought to re-evaluate tradition in light of the social, political, commercial, and religious changes that had occurred.
18
Masud discusses these changes in some detail and summarizes their impact on legal thought as follows:
The spread of Sufi tariqas had contributed to idleness and an exaggerated ideal of Islamic piety that constricted the concept of legal obligation. The influence of Razism increased the influence of Shafi'i and Ash'ari schools of thought. The establishment of the madrassa system promoted education and widened its scope. The economic changes, especially the new developments in the Mediterranean trade, challenged the Andalusian Maliki legal concepts and theories on trade and commerce. In a number of situations, the new trade practices came into apparent conflict with the prevailing doctrines of Islamic law.
19
Like the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had a profound impact on the Muslim world because of the significant and lasting psychological, socio-cultural, religious, economic, and political impacts of European colonial rule. European colonial rule left a legacy of anti-Western sentiments, fragmentation of legal codes, inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflict, poverty and underdevelopment, and unrepresentative authoritarian rule.
20
The struggle to reassert an Islamic identity in the socio-political context gave rise to political Islam and the concept of the Islamic state based on the shariah. However, half a century since independence from European colonial rule has given Muslim-majority countries relative stability, sufficient for Islamic intellectuals to contemplate the appropriate role of Islam in state and society, the realities of modernity, relations with the West, and the value of Western systems and institutions. In this context, a revival of interest in the maqasid developed by the turn of the century.
As an approach to interpreting and applying the Qur'an, the maqasid can be traced back to the administration of the second caliph, Umar bin al-Khattab (d. 644) and the Maliki School of Islamic jurisprudence, which emphasizes public interest or maslaha. The expansion of maqasid beyond al-Ghazali's conception began with Izz al-Din Abd al-Salam's (d. 1261) work on the qawa'id al-ahkam or "legal maxims," which broadened the discussion of maqasid in terms of promoting benefit and preventing harm.
24
A more open-ended list of values, identified by Ibn Taymiyyah, which included fulfillment of contracts, preservation of kinship ties, honoring the rights of one's neighbors, sincerity, trustworthiness and moral purity further expanded the maqasid. Ibn Taymiyyah objected to the essential objectives of Islamic law being limited to the five maqasid expounded by al-Ghazali, stating that these five or six do not represent the highest or most significant of objectives.
25
The work of al-Shatibi, however, made a more profound contribution to the theory of maqasid by focusing on the concept of maslaha (public interest) 26 as an approach to overcoming the rigidity imposed by literalism and qiyas (analogical reasoning). The maqasid theory of al-Shatibi is based on an inductive reading of the Qur'an in order to identify the higher objectives, intent and purpose of the Qur'anic verses, which are understood to preserve human interests in both this world and the next. In practical terms, however, the maqasid received little attention from Islamic jurists and legal scholars in the seven hundred years since al-Shatibi. Relatively few books have been written on Islamic law from a maqasid perspective. Moreover, maqasid has never presented a serious challenge to the usul methodology of the classical era, which is based on a fairly literal reading of the sacred texts and generally extends ijtihad (independent reasoning) only as far as qiyas.
27
During the formative years of Islamic law, the eighth to the tenth century, jurists displayed a wider degree of confidence in a methodology that relied heavily on qiyas. Due to their close proximity to the time and space of the Prophet Muhammad (d. 632), the classical jurists could, to a greater extent, engage in literalism and be somewhat confident in 22 While interest in the maqasid among Islamic scholars has grown since the turn of the century, this phenomenon cannot be attributed to the ulema (religious clerics) whom have said and written very little about the maqasid.
By comparison, university-based Islamic intellectuals have given considerably more attention to the maqasid over the past decade. 38 However, the rebirth of the maqasid approach in the political realm is primarily due to second generation Islamic-oriented political parties whose leaders assert that good governance, economic development, and protecting basic rights and freedoms are Islamic objectives. 
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Maqasid is an Arabic word that means intent, purpose or objectives. The concept gained prominence in the fourteenth century as a philosophy of Islamic law. It has generally been used by Islamic scholars in reference to the higher objectives of shariah or maqasid alshariah.
39
I contend, however, that confining maqasid to shariah diminishes the dynamism and functionality of the concept as well as its relevance for political Islam. The most appropriate approach is to consider the maqasid of Islam generally and in specific terms to identify the maqasid of particular issues contained in the Qur'an. In this respect, one might consult all of the verses in the Qur'an concerning matters of war and peace in order to identify the maqasid of jihad or all of the verses that mention women in order to identify the maqasid in respect to gender relations and the rights and status of women.
40
The maqasid approach emphasizes public interest and well-being (maslaha), rejects literal readings of sacred texts, and gives priority to the spirit of the message of the Qur'an and Prophetic traditions.
41
As opposed to reading verses of the Qur'an in isolation, the maqasid approach requires a comprehensive reading of the text as an integrated whole in order to identify the higher objectives and then interpreting particular verses on a given topic according to the identified maqasid. This methodology dictates that once the maqasid of a particular issue is identified, all verses in the Qur'an concerning that issue should then be read in light of the identified maqasid and none of these verses should then be interpreted in a way that contradicts the identified maqasid.
42

II. THE MATURATION OF POLITICAL ISLAM
An enduring perception among many Muslims until today is that European colonial rule attempted to remove Islam from the colonized Muslim-majority countries and replace an Islamic identity and culture with Western norms and values. The experience of European colonial rule continues to drive many Islamic political parties to fixate on asserting their Islamic identity and pursuing moralistic policies in order for society to retain or regain its Islamic identity. The rise and success of Islamic political parties in Muslim-majority countries is seen by many Muslims as completing the process of independence from European colonial rule and achieving meaningful freedom. achieved independence from colonial rule and came to power were largely seen, in a cultural sense, as an extension of the former colonial rulers. For many Muslims, the process of independence was not complete, and only the election of Islamic parties that reflect the identity and values of the people would finally mark the country's true independence from colonization.
43
A study conducted by World Public Opinion (WPO) and the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) found that the majority of Muslims agree that "all people should have the right to organise themselves into political parties and run candidates, including Islamist groups" in Azerbaijan (75%), Indonesia (81%), Jordan (50%), Pakistan (83%), Palestine (69%) and Turkey (53%). Only minorities of respondents agreed that "Islamists groups should not be allowed to organise and run candidates because their ultimate goals are not consistent with democracy" in Azerbaijan (24%), Indonesia (8%), Jordan (26%), Pakistan (16%), Palestine (30%), and Turkey (30%). This approach is reflected in PKR's political manifesto in which priority is given to economic development, poverty reduction, safe and fair working conditions, education, healthcare and housing. 48 The preservation of an Islamic identity and desire for society to be based on Islamic values and norms remains strong among many Muslims today, which in large part explains the electoral success of Islamic-oriented parties even in more secular Muslim counties such as Turkey, Indonesia and Malaysia. This phenomenon also largely explains the success of Islamic parties in the post-uprising elections in Tunisia and Egypt where the largest plurality of votes was won by the An-Nahda Party 49 and the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party respectively. 50 The leaders of both parties have emphasized their respective party's commitment to the principles of democracy and their respect for the will of their people. However, representatives of both parties have expressed reservations and even opposition to secularism 47 Infused with a belief in Islam as the solution to the social, economic and political problems of Muslim-majority countries, the first generation of Islamic political parties were able to capitalize on a wave of postcolonial public frustration with the existing political order and a longing for stability, justice and prosperity envisioned through the implementation of shariah and the establishment of an Islamic state. The first generation of Islamic political parties were anti-Western and generally exclusivist, appealing to only so-called pious Muslims, and thereby alienating non-Muslims, liberals, secularists, and segments of the business community. Their moralistic rhetoric and ideologyoriented politics attracted distrust and opposition from a range of constituencies including secularists, moderate Muslims, and nonMuslim minorities as well as Western governments. These parties failed to deliver on good governance and socio-economic advancement in accordance with the expectations of the masses. Post-9/11, they were also stigmatized by the violence of Islamist groups with which they were rightly or wrongly believed to be associated, which were perceived to be a risk to the nation's reputation within the international community. An example of which involves Morocco's PJD. When a series of bombings occurred in Casablanca in 2003, which left forty-five dead and over one hundred wounded, the reputation of the PJD was tarnished. Perekli explains that although the bombings were carried out by an extremist Islamist group with which the PJD had no affiliation, the party "was stigmatized by the state authorities, leftist secular parties, and the secular media alike." Opponents argued that it had been the PJD's anti-Western and anti-Israel rhetoric which had laid the ideological groundwork for the attacks.
57
Even while Islamists were enjoying some political successes in the 1990s, their victories came amid discussion about the failure of political Islam. 60 Rather, such states are among the poorest in terms of performance on key social, economic and political measures. No positive correlation is observable between a more full or comprehensive implementation of shariah and progress toward a more just and equitable social order in terms of human, gender and minority rights; political participation and stability; good governance and government accountability and transparency; economic advancement; equitable distribution of wealth; educational attainment; and national power.
61
In large part, the problem is that these values, goals and standards are not the emphasized priorities of the modern conventional conception of shariah. Rather, they are often associated with the West, devalued, dismissed by Islamists and not included as part of the Islamic agenda. 62 This point has been reaffirmed in a study by Rehman and Askari, which found an Islamicity Index to measure a country's adherence to Islamic principles, with four sub-indices related to economic, legal and governance, human and political rights, and international relations, and concludes that so-called Islamic countries rated poorly against all measures. 
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an Islamic state is one in which "legal order is based on and derived from the principles of the shariah," which he adds "should not, however, be interpreted to mean that the Islamic state's purpose is to impose a narrowly defined code of behavior on society."
64
In terms of legislation, the domain of the state is to regulate individual behavior in relation to the society as a whole or what might be termed maslaha mursalah (public good), while matters of morality and worship (akhlaq and ibadat) as well as the regulation of behavior between members of society (mu'amalat) fall within the domain of the ummah or civil society. Thus, the purpose of the Islamic state is to "facilitate the realization of the human mission . . . to coordinate the activities of the ummah in ways that will enable a society to cope with economic and political challenges and to enhance the quality of life in the community."
65
It is the pursuit of these objectives within the framework of shariah that makes a state "Islamic." However, the legitimacy of the state is derived from the will of the ummah, including the ulema, which historically controlled or at least held influence over judicial, educational and social institutions, so that the power to enact law remained with the people rather than the ruler. Moreover, as the legitimacy of the state depends upon the extent to which its organization and power reflects the will of the ummah, Islamic legitimacy is conferred upon political systems based on elected representative rule.
66
By the late 1990s, the first generation of Islamic political parties either evolved or was eclipsed by a second generation with a more comprehensive political program, broader electoral appeal, and a focus on Islamic values and principles rather than the letter of shariah law. The first generation of Islamic political parties lost the confidence of the Muslim electorate due to their lack of effective response to the major social, political and economic problems of Muslim-majority countries; their inability to connect with non-Muslim minorities and secularists; and the suspicion and concern they evoke among Western powers. 
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Democratic Action Party (DAP) based on a multi-ethnic platform led by the popular Anwar Ibrahim.
73
Anwar Ibrahim personally advocates a maqasid approach that is in contrast with the more literal conception of shariah that the Islamic party PAS has historically displayed. 74 However, for several years now, the new generation of PAS leadership also endorses a maqasid approach 75 as does its main political rival, Malaysia's ruling United Malays National Party (UMNO). 76 Vali Nasr 77 and others 78 use the term "Muslim democrats" to refer to Muslim political parties that do not pursue the establishment of a state based on shariah but advocate "viable electoral platforms and stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interestsIslamic as well as secular." 
80
This strategy has attracted voters who previously supported Islamist political parties, while their secular foundation has enabled their pursuit of Islamization policies without attracting the ire of Western governments. Other scholars, however, contend that Muslim democrats also include Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (MB), Indonesia's PKS, and Turkey's AKP-parties that did not start from a secular origin only to later adopt Muslim values for political expediency, but rather have a genuine Islamic foundation and have genuinely internalized the principles of democracy.
81
The Arab uprisings in the MENA region since the end of 2010 are a clear and profound expression of support for democracy among Muslims. The protests were not Islamist in their demands but are framed by the protestors as movements for freedom and democracy. With the notable exceptions of Libya and Syria, the uprisings, particularly in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, were nonviolent (in terms of the actions of protestors who faced violent repression from the state). Even in the case of Libya and Syria, the armed resistance of rebels was not portrayed in the media as jihadist but as freedom fighting. The uprisings were also not framed as Islamist movements or led by those who are identifiably Islamist.
82
In this context, justice, dignity, freedom and democracy came to be seen as higher objectives of the people and their cause. Such slogans as "Islamic state" and "Islamic solutions" have been discredited as lacking in substance and viability 83 and were notably absent from the protests. This shift in thinking has created space for the emergence of social movements that are consistent with Islamic values and principles but without the modern conventional Islamist label and slogans. Consequently, the uprisings have been more inclusive, comprised of Muslims and Christians as well as Islamists and secularists. 84 Islamic political parties such as An-Nahda in Tunisia as well as Egypt's Freedom and Justice Party have found a base of support among such social movements. However, among the challenges confronting these parties is how they will balance their Islamic identity with the demands of governance in the context of modernity.
III. MAQASID AND THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM
The second generation of Islamic-oriented political parties, including Turkey's AKP, Malaysia's PKR, and Indonesia's PKS, are not inherently secular, having adopted Muslim values and Islamized public policies for pragmatic political purposes; nor are these parties Islamist, having adopted democracy as a political tactic. Their approach to politics and policies have been accepted by Muslims as Islamically legitimate largely on account of these parties' leaders' personal qualities, their sound Islamic credentials, previous experience with Islamic groups and movements, and their personal commitment to the Islamic faith.
Moreover, second generation Islamic-oriented political parties are the product of the evolution of their leaders, members, and constituencies. These parties have evolved from earlier political parties as in the case of Turkey's AKP or from Islamist organizations as in the case of Indonesia's PKS and Tunisia's An-Nahda, which evolved from Islamic da'wah and revivalist social movements respectively. This windy road reflects the restrictions imposed on Islamic political parties in the MENA region generally. Moreover, it was not until 2004, under internal pressure from the monarchy and public opinion over links with Islamic extremism, when PJD "differentiated" itself from its Islamic base, the United Reform Movement (MUR), that PJD was able to "devise public policies to find practical solutions to day-to-day problems, while leaving the discussions of how to consolidate religiosity with society to the MUR." 87 Perekli explains that this effectively meant that MUR retained responsibility for "Islamic idealism" while PJD could become policy-oriented with "an Islamic reference" as emphasized by the party.
88
With the exception of Turkey's AKP, evolution from an Islamic social movement to an ideology-oriented political party to a policyoriented political party has often correlated with the adoption of a maqasid approach. This approach is well developed within PKR and PKS and is beginning to take root among other parties including Malaysia's PAS, Morocco's PJD, and more recently in Tunisia's AnNahda Party. 
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Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, Mandala of South Africa, and Nasrallah of Hezbollah all polling nine percent. Most importantly, forty-four percent of Egyptian respondents chose Turkey when they were asked to name the political system they would prefer Egypt's political system to look like. The next closest were France (10%); Saudi Arabia, China and Germany (8%); the United States (5%), the United Kingdom (4%), and Iran (with less than two percent).
95
Sixty-one percent of people in the MENA region regard Turkey as a model for their country with the highest levels of support coming from respondents in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. 96 Importantly, this sentiment is shared by many of the emerging Islamic political parties in the region. Mohammad Shaqfah, leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, has expressed his support for the Turkish model and stated that his party would follow the Turkish governance system.
97
The leader of Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC) Mustafa Abdul Jalil has called Turkey a model for Libya and the other Arab Spring countries. He stated in Today's Zaman that "Turkey's democratic structure is an example to Libya and the other countries that experienced the Arab Spring. Libya will look to Turkey as a model for its own political and democratic structure." Most recently, the AKP were returned to power, winning fifty percent of the vote in Turkey's 2011 elections.
102
The party has a comprehensive and progressive political program that covers fundamental rights and freedoms; the economy; public administration; foreign policy; and social policies that include education, culture and art, health, social security, labor, equal participation and rights for women, family and social services, youth and sports, urbanization and housing, environmental protection, science and technology, written and visual media, and road safety. 103 The AKP aims to achieve its political program through the promotion of universal rights and freedoms; addressing Turkey's social, economic and administrative problems; mobilizing the country's human and physical resources; raising living standards of all and reducing the income distribution gap; supporting civil society and including non-governmental organizations in public administration; and ensuring public sector transparency and accountability.
104
With respect to foreign policy, the AKP recognizes Turkey's strategic location between the Middle East and Europe and seeks to maintain positive relations with both. The AKP sees Turkey as an important contributor to the security and stability in the region and increasingly central to more positive relations between Islam and the West.
105
The AKP is committed to achieving Turkey's membership in the European Union and maintaining the country's importance within NATO. It seeks to maintain Turkey's positive relations with the United States, expanding the relationship from one based primarily on defense cooperation to also include economic matters, investment, science and technology. 106 Simultaneously, the AKP desires positive relations with the Russian Federation, China, South East Asia and the Middle East. 
110
Although Erdoğan explained that "secularism doesn't mean a lack of religion but creating respect for all religions and religious freedoms for all people" the term has a strongly negative connotation among Islamists. Essam El-Erian stated in response that secularism has "a very bad perception among Egyptians" and that "we have no need for this term."
111
It should be noted that according to Gallup World Polling, almost two-thirds of Egyptians want shariah to be the only source of legislation. 112 Additionally, in an interview with Hurriyet Daily News, the Tunisian Foreign Minister Rafik Abdessalem conceded that a different interpretation of secularism from that of Turkey would be needed in Tunisia as his country strongly values it's Arab, Muslim identity.
113
It is also important to highlight that Turkey differs from much of the Muslim world, and the MENA region in particular, in respect to the appeal of Islamism. Since the 1980s, most Muslim governments, The most significant exception is Turkey, whose leaders have never been pressured to Islamize policies or appeal to Islam. 115 This could well be due to the restraint the secular regime imposed on Islamists in Turkey but an equally likely explanation is that the Turkish population has not expressed significant demand for Islamic policies or law.
116
The experience of European colonial rule had a profound impact on the Arab countries in terms of the development and orientation of their Islamic organizations and especially their views of the West and such concepts as secularism. Islamic political parties in the Arab world generally developed as social movements that opposed the political status quo and rejected secularism in favor of Islam playing a comprehensive role in state and society. By contrast, not having experienced European colonial rule, Turkey's Islamic political parties operated within the existing political system, did not challenge the legitimacy of the state, and while they proposed alternative definitions of secularism, they did not oppose the concept. 117 Moreover, Turkey's AKP has the benefit of evolving out of earlier Turkish Islamic political parties, namely the Welfare Party (WP) followed by the Virtue Party (VP). In the 1990s, WP began the transition from an Islamic identityoriented party to a policy-oriented party with a broader electoral appeal. However, it was officially closed down as part of a crackdown on Islamist activism and anti-secular activities. 
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THE RELEVANCE OF A MAQASID APPROACH 513 religion and politics. He explained that there is no benefit in a political party making religious references; religious propaganda is not the function of a political party; a political party must serve all people; religious observance is a matter for individuals, not the government; and religion is relevant only in the political context of ensuring individual freedoms.
120
In respect to historical experiences and contemporary contexts, Turkey's AKP differs significantly from the Islamic political parties of the MENA region. Political parties such as Egypt's FJP, Tunisia's AnNahda, and Morocco's PJD, for instance, are yet to complete the transition from identity or ideology-oriented parties to policy-oriented parties. They remain skeptical of, if not opposed to, secularism; and they operate in a context where the prospect of implementing shariah law appeals to a significant proportion of their respective populations. These factors detract from the extent to which the AKP can be considered a model for the emerging Islamic political parties of the MENA region.
IV. ALTERNATIVE MAQASID MODELS: MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA
The example of the Islamic-oriented political parties of South East Asia may be more instructive than Turkey because of their more similar countries. Malaysia's PKR and Indonesia's PKS do not face the same constitutional constraints as the AKP and are more overt in their commitment to a maqasid approach. PKR and PKS are deeply committed to policies that advance justice, human rights, education, government accountability and transparency and economic development, which they regard as the maqasid or higher objectives of Islam. In Malaysia's most recent elections in 2008, the PKR won nineteen percent of the vote, thirty-one seats of the 222-seat parliament making it the strongest opposition party in the country.
121
In Indonesia's most recent elections in 2009, the PKS won eight percent of the vote, fifty-seven seats of the 550-seat parliament, and as part of the governing coalition the party has four ministers in the government. imprisonment. Among the seventeen points that comprise the PKR's objectives are establishing "a society that is fair and democratic, progressive and united," upholding "the rule of law, independent media and judicial and security institutions of the sovereign principles of professionalism," ensuring "the freedom to think, speak, move, assemble and association for all" and expanding "the role of religion and values to uphold universal truth of justice, moral conduct, humanitarian and human dignity."
123
The party is also committed to the development of "a just and dynamic economy, which emphasizes growth and equitable distribution; is free from injustice, inconsistency and waste; while overcoming poverty and prevents wealth concentration in one party." 124 Also in terms of social justice, the PKR is concerned with the provision of "education, healthcare, housing, and public transport at reasonable cost in accordance with social responsibility, especially for low and middle income groups" as well as policies that "protect the right to work, fair wages, safety at work and the quality of life for all," including women's "rights and interests and ensuring that they can enjoy equal status and do not become victims of discrimination and exploitation." Other objectives of the PKR extend to the protection of the environment and the rights of indigenous populations. 125 The absence of specific invocation of Islam or Quranic concepts in this document is noteworthy.
Muhammad In the words of Ishaaq, "the international community is now concerned about the [issues] similar to the maqasid, the universal values. It's time to declare the original objectives of Islamic teaching . . . the maqasid shariah. We are now moving to that." He goes on to explain that the main priorities of the PKS are education, public service, health-care, income levels, and the standard of living which reflect the maqasid.
129
On this point, Syed Husin Ali, deputy president of the PKR, adds that for an Islamic-oriented political party in a pluralistic society, the maqasid "is the best approach because I think it can be easily understood not only by the Muslims but by the non-Muslims alike. If you approach from a fundamentalist angle then it becomes very difficult to explain." 130 The potential of the maqasid approach to enable a change of discourse would benefit such parties as Tunisia's An-Nahda in its transition to a policy-oriented party.
Torelli's analysis of Rachid Ghanouchi's speeches and An-Nahda's political manifesto shows that the party's vocabulary is very dependent on Islamic culture and Quranic concepts, which narrows the appeal of the party, restricts its ability to evolve from an ideology-oriented to a policy-oriented party, and leaves it open to criticism from liberals, secularists, and non-Muslim constituents. 131 Moreover, just as An-Nahda finds itself in a political environment still dominated by the secular institutions of the previous regime, the example of Indonesia's PKS is instructive given the secularism of Indonesian politics as a consequence of the nation's commitment to the principles of Pancasila since independence.
132
In this respect, PKS found the maqasid approach to be beneficial also in terms of how the party reconciles its identity with the secular nature of the state. While many Muslims hear anti-religion or anti-Islam when the word secularism is mentioned, this conception is now being challenged by current Islamic discourse. The leader of the Tunisian An-Nahda Party, Rachid Ghanouchi, has previously declared his opposition to secularism and commitment to all Tunisian laws being compatible with shariah. 133 However, in the aftermath of the uprisings in Tunisia, he said "I envisage an AKP-style structure. They prove that Islam and democracy can go together." 134 In a recent speech at a forum hosted by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID), Ghanouchi went even further and made a case for the place of secularism within an Islamic worldview: "The greater part of the debate taking place nowadays in our country is a misunderstanding of such concepts as secularism and Islam. . . . secularism is not an atheist philosophy but merely a set of procedural arrangements designed to safeguard the freedom of belief and thought." 135 Ghanouchi explained that within the legal tradition of Islam, there is an acknowledgement of the distinctions between (or separation of) the civil (mu'amalat) and the religious (ibadat) in terms of human action and interaction. He added:
It is not the duty of religion to teach us agricultural, industrial or even governing techniques, because reason is qualified to reach these truths through the accumulation of experiences. The role of religion, however, is to answer the big question for us, those relating to our existence, origins, destiny, and the purpose for which we were created, and to provide us with a system of values and principles that would guide our thinking, behaviour, and the regulations of the state to which we aspire.
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In reconciling Islam and secularism, Ghanouchi draws on the maqasid, referring specifically to its historical and contemporary founders:
This distinction between the religious and the political is also clear in the thought of Islamic scholars/jurists. They have distinguished between the system of transactions/dealings (mu'amalat) and that of worship (ibadat External relations, particularly with the United States, will be another significant challenge for the emerging Islamic parties in the MENA region. Comments made by the U.S. Secretary of State on her first visit to the region since the election of Mohammad Morsi as Egypt's president indicate that the United States is concerned about the role shariah may play in domestic policies, particularly concerning women and minority groups. 138 Again, the experiences of Islamic parties in South East Asia are instructive. In addition to providing the PKR and PKS the scope and flexibility to effectively operate amidst diverse and competing internal social forces, the maqasid approach also allows these parties to avoid objections from external forces that generally hold pejorative views of Islam and are suspicious of Islamicoriented parties. PKS president Ishaaq contends that Western countries such as the United States and Australia are better able to identify with parties such as the PKS that adopt the universal values enshrined in the maqasid than the first generation Islamists that retain literalist views of shariah and advocate an Islamic state. The Islamic values derived from a maqasid perspective, he explains, are "al-Ma'ruf, the acceptable values [that] everybody will accept even if they don't believe in God." 139 In the aftermath of 9/11, senior Western diplomats and policymakers encouraged their respective governments to differentiate between radical Islamists who advocate the use of violence and Islamicoriented political parties that reject the use of violence and advocate democracy. 140 
Edward Djerejian contends that dialogue between the 489]
THE RELEVANCE OF A MAQASID APPROACH 519 in order to pursue Islamic objectives. In this respect, the maqasid approach has enabled the second generation of Islamic-oriented political parties to redefine the conception and application of Islam in the contemporary socio-political context.
CONCLUSION
Islamic political parties continue to be challenged by the realities of modernity as well as the demographics of their own countries. Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation, developed a more secular political regime than neighboring Malaysia despite the fact that Muslims are only a slight majority of the Malaysian population. Malaysian Islamic political parties, however, are challenged by the religio-ethnic pluralism of their country. In both countries, Islamic political parties have had to appeal to broad and diverse constituencies; develop effective policies that address their nation's social, economic and political challenges; counter negativity associated with extremist Islamist groups; and maintain productive international relations while maintaining their commitment to Islamic values and principles. Both the Indonesia's PKS and Malaysia's PRK, later followed by PAS and UMNO, have found the maqasid approach to be effective in meeting these demands.
The development of the maqasid approach among South East Asian Islamic political parties is instructive for the emerging Islamic political parties of the MENA region. While there is currently a fixation on Turkey's AKP as the model for such parties as Egypt's FJP, Tunisia's An-Nahda and Morocco's PJD, opposing views on secularism stemming from contrasting historical experiences and different experiences with political Islam between Turkey and the Arab countries detract from the viability of the so-called "Turkish model." Like the leaders of Muslim-majority countries of South East Asia, the leaders of various Arab regimes were all impacted by the resurgence of Islam in the second half of the twentieth century; and in response, they made appeals to Islam and they Islamized certain policies. However, such concessions to Islam were never made in Turkey, which reflects the contrasting position of Islam in the socio-political context in Turkey compared to the broader Muslim world. While studies show that majorities of Muslims in the Arab world want their state and society to be consistent with Islamic values and norms, the majority does not necessarily vote for Islamic parties. The data suggests that with the liberalizing of political participation in the Arab world, the appeal of Islamic political parties will decrease if all they have to offer is ideology.
The first generation of Islamic political parties had some appeal as they were seen to respect and reflect Islamic values and norms in countries where the masses felt their identity and independence threatened by the experience of European colonial rule followed by repressive authoritarian regimes. However, these parties were ideologyoriented, narrow in their appeal, and deficient in terms of policies capable of addressing social, political and economic needs. Such parties also attracted opposition from Western powers, liberals and secularists as well as ruling regimes hostile to political Islam. Consequently, the first generation of Islamic political parties evolved into or was superseded by a second generation comprised of parties that have broad electoral appeal, and are policy-oriented. For them, Islam is relevant in terms of values, principles and higher objectives. It is in this context that the maqasid approach has developed.
Given the demands on the emerging Islamic political parties of the MENA region to respect and reflect Islamic values and principles while developing policies that deliver on governance, economic growth, employment opportunities and protection of basic rights and freedoms, the maqasid approach should be expected to become more widely embraced. This development will have profound implications for the conception and application of Islam in the socio-political context and is likely to result in the emergence of a system that could accurately be termed "Islamic democracy." Moreover, the maqasid approach has significant implications for Islamic legal thought and for the reform of shariah-based laws in Muslim-majority countries. This reform rests upon the potential of the maqasid approach to contribute to the democratization process.
